Chapter 7

Moral-Character Education

Daniel Lapsley and David Yeager

Moral-Character Education

This chapter addresses one of the foundational issues that confront parents and educators: What is to be done about the moral character formation of children? Few would doubt that raising children of strong moral character is a highly desirable goal for socialization. Most parents would be disappointed if their children entered adulthood with only slight acquaintance with moral norms, dispositions, or emotions, or evinced these qualities only on occasion. But not only parents. The development of moral character is also a broadly shared goal that animates the work of socialization agents in every contextual setting that involves children, including schools and churches, youth organizations and other community institutions. Indeed, the concern over the proper induction of the younger generation by the older into the norms and canons of good conduct is probably a universal of the human experience.

Yet the terms of reference for moral character education (MCE) is broadly contested whatever the basic agreement on the desirability of its goals (Goodman & Lesnick, 2001). Historically, the terms moral education and character education have pointed to different psychological traditions, ethical theories, curricular objectives and pedagogical preferences. Whether one is a moral educator or a character educator is thought to reveal something about one’s paradigmatic allegiances, about where one stands in terms of certain defining issues that sorts one into rival camps, with each camp having its own professional society (e.g., Association for Moral Education, the Character Education Partnership) and professional journal (e.g., Journal of Moral Education, Journal of Research in Character Education). We consider these distinctions in the present chapter. Our own perspective is that there is now more consensus than controversy, that paradigmatic allegiances are held without the same fervor as before, and that a reasonable middle way between camps is a realistic option (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006). Our title elides the paradigmatic divide and reflects this optimism about finding common ground.
But what counts as moral or character education? As we see the boundaries of our topic are not easy to map. Moral character education can be expansive or non-expansive (Kristjansson, 2002), broad or narrow (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006), traditional or progressive (Wynne, 1997). Although it is often conceived as something that takes place in schools, how it plays out within families and communities is also a concern (Berkowitz, Vincent, & McKay, 2002; Hart, Matsuba, & Atkins, 2008; Lies, Bronk, & Mariano, 2008). The purpose of moral character education is also contested. For some educators MCE is a prophylaxis against the rising tide of youth disorder and is motivated by deep anxiety about adolescent risk behavior, misconduct and delinquency (Brooks & Goble, 1997; Lickona, 1991; Wynne & Hess, 1992). For others MCE is closely aligned with positive youth development, which aims for the full preparation of all youth, not just those at risk for problem behavior (Berkowitz, Sherblom, Bier, & Battistich, 2006; Catalano, Hawkins, & Toumbourou, 2008). Risk free is not fully prepared is the motto of this movement (Roth & Brooks-Gunn, 2003).

How MCE aligns with classroom instructional or academic goals also varies considerably (Stengel & Tom, 2006). There are issues concerning effective implementation of MCE programs and of its connection to wide-ranging educational purposes, including early education (Berkowitz & Grych, 2000) civics education (Berkowitz, 2000) and science (Berkowitz & Simmons, 2003) education among others; and concerns about how to prepare preservice and in-service teachers for their role as moral character educators (Berkowitz, 1999; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008; Schwartz, 2008). How to understand moral character formation in sports (Power, Sheehan, K., & Carnevale, 2010; Shields & Bredemeier, 2005, 2008), the university (Brandenberger, 2005; Colby, Ehrlich, Beaumont, & Stephens, 2003) and professions (Bebeau & Monson, 2008) are also important areas of study.

In this chapter we begin with some orienting assumptions about the nature of moral character and the place of values in the daily life of schools. We then compare and contrast the two dominant paradigms along several dimensions but with the aim of arriving at a middle way. In the third section we examine three general theoretical approaches to MCE, including moral stage and domain theory and the recent interest in moral self-identity as an educational goal. In the fourth section programmatic approaches to MCE are reviewed with the aim of determining “what works.” A discussion of delivery mechanisms and implementation issues are taken up in the fifth section. We conclude with a reflection on the implications of these literatures for parent and teacher education.
Assumptions and Paradigms

The history of American education reveals intense but periodic interest in MCE (McClellan, 1999). There are at least two ways to read this history. On one account there was a halcyon golden age when character education in public schools was intentional, pervasive, and unproblematic. However, public schools later retreated from character education as a result of broad changes in science, society and culture, with disastrous consequences for the well-being of youth and society.

Lickona (1991) noted four broad trends: (1) Darwin’s theory of evolution uprooted the notion that traditional morality was fixed, static and unchanging; (2) Einstein’s theory of relativity encouraged the view that moral claims might be relative to certain points of view; (3) Hartshorne and May’s (1928–1930) classic research on character traits in schools showed that students’ ethical behavior was highly situation-dependent; (4) and the general rise of logical positivism encouraged the view that the only sensible things to say were those amenable to publicly verifiable empirical demonstrations (as “facts”), while everything else (“values”) was held to be subjective, personal and quite literally “non-sense” (see, e.g., Ayer, 1952).

For Lickona (1991) these four trends put intentional character education on the defensive. “When much of society,” he writes, “came to think of morality as being in flux [Darwin], relative to the individual [Einstein], situationally variable [Hartshorne and May] and essentially private [logical positivism], public schools retreated from their once central role as moral educator” (p. 8). Along similar lines Kristjansson (2002) points to a crumbling of a belief in direct moral-character formation in schools, leading to moral concerns being sidelined “from mainstream educational discourse in the Western world and marginalizing, if not wholly extirpating, references to the cultivation of character of children via school curricula and other school processes” (p. 136).

A second reading also tracks the rise and fall of character education but with a different diagnosis. Cunningham (2005) argued that the periodic rise of character education in U.S. history was often accompanied by periods of cataclysmic change in U.S. society, when there were profound challenges to national identity and widespread anxiety about the unsettling forces of modernity. But this interest was hard to sustain in the absence of an adequate character psychology to guide curricular intervention and instructional practice. According to Cunningham, “Unless psychology can provide a better model of human development . . . character will continue to receive sporadic and faddish treatment and the public’s common school will continue to be undermined” (p. 197). The closer alignment of the ethical conceptions of moral character with advances in the
cognitive, developmental and personality sciences is a decided recent trend that should hold promise for educational intervention.

The two readings of the history of character education suggest two issues. The first concerns the place of values and morality in U.S. classrooms; the second concerns how best to conceptualize character. We next sketch our working assumptions on these two issues.

**Immanence and Inevitability**

It should not be supposed that even during periods when MCE was said to have been stricken from U.S. schools or fallen out of favor that values education was ever absent from classrooms and schools. There is no such thing as values-free education. Moral values saturate the daily life of classrooms and schools (Bryk, 1988; Goodlad, 1992; Strike, 1996). Moral values are embedded inextricably in the “hidden curriculum” of instructional practice—in the topics chosen (or excluded) for instruction; in the demand for truth and excellence, good effort and mastery; in the way teachers establish classroom routines, form groups, enforce discipline; and in the way students experience community and school membership. It is intrinsic in the notion of what it means to develop, to set goals and to aspire to achieve them (Carr, 1991). As ethicist Richard Baer (1993, p. 15) put it, “Every curriculum that is more than simple technical instruction rests on fundamental understandings and commitments regarding the nature of reality itself, the nature of the good life and the good society, and how one ought to live.” In these ways character formation is intrinsic to classrooms and an inescapable part of the educator’s craft (Hansen, 1993; Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993).

The immanence of values and the inevitability of moral education are embedded deeply in the life of classrooms and schools. Moreover the immanence-and-inevitability of MCE would seem to arm the character educator with all the resources that are needed to defend an intentional and transparent commitment to the moral formation of students. The case is made by pointing to the fact that moral considerations are immanent to the life of classrooms and schools; that teaching and learning are value-laden activities; that moral aims are intrinsic to education. Making the case implies that it is unacceptable to allow the immanence-and-inevitability of character education to remain part of a school’s hidden curriculum. If character education is hidden it cannot be tended properly. The value commitments immanent to education must be transparent and the object of intentional instruction (Rivers, 2004).

Stengel and Tom (2006) define morality broadly as that which concerns right relationship and that which is worth doing. As such moral language is found pervasively in classrooms and schools. It is found routinely in the conversations
between teachers and students, as in the following examples (from Stengel and Tom, 2006, p. 25):

“Please show respect for the person who is speaking by listening carefully and then responding.”

“Why did the settlers treat the Indians that way? It doesn’t seem fair?”

“Boys and girls, this is a wonderful story about friendship, isn’t it?”

“Mrs. Quinn, Brendan is pulling my hair.”

“Whose responsibility is it to clean up the lab?”

This is moral language because it implicates right relation or something worth doing. These are examples of the way that morality is immanent in the daily life of schools; and is so pervasive and prosaic that one hardly notices it. It is hidden because it is common and in plain sight. Contrast moral language with what Stengel and Tom (2006) call language about morality. Here are their examples:

“Whose morals?”

“There hasn’t been any morality in schools since prayer was banished?”

“Kids today need character. They are not getting it at home.”

“Discipline is the key to effective schooling.”

“Our policy is zero tolerance.”

Moral language—the language of right relation and what is worth doing—has never been absent in schools and continues apace irrespective of the language about morality that waxes and wanes with the rise and fall of paradigmatic commitments. But moral language is not easy to speak. Ethical theory is multiform and divided. There are moral dialects that strain fluency and comprehension (MacIntyre, 1981). We examine some of the implications of moral language for understanding MCE below, but first we turn to the second issue revealed by the history of MCE, which is how to understand character.

### Character Psychology

The word character is derived from a Greek word meaning to mark as on an engraving. One’s character is said to indicate something about consistency and predictability; an enduring dispositional tendency to behave in certain ways. There are many definitions. Character refers to good traits that are on regular display (Wynne & Ryan, 1997); to sets of habits that “patterns our actions in a relatively fixed way” (Niegorski & Ellrod, 1992, p. 143); to a “relatively settled general disposition of a person to do what is morally good,” where the general disposition can be analyzed into traits or virtues that hang together in certain ways (Davis, 2003, p. 33); to a general approach to social dilemmas, a capacity for empathy, self-discipline and the acquisition of prosocial skills and knowledge about
conventions and values (Etzioni, 1996; Hay, Castle, Stimson & Davies, 1995). Davidson, Lickona, and Khmelkov (2008) distinguish between performance character as a mastery orientation required for excellent performance (e.g., diligence, perseverance, work ethic, positive attitude) and moral character as a relational orientation needed for interpersonal relationships and good conduct (e.g., integrity, respect, justice, caring, responsibility). Berkowitz (2002, p. 48) defines character as “an individual’s set of psychological characteristics that affect that person’s ability and inclinations to function morally.” Seven psychological characteristics make up the “moral anatomy”: moral behavior, moral values, moral personality, moral emotion, moral reasoning, moral identity, and other foundational characteristics that support moral functioning.

Clearly, character is a complex construct that includes traits, habits and virtues organized into a “complex constellation of psychological dimensions of a person” (Berkowitz, 2002, p. 49). One difficulty is that these descriptors carry a heavy semantic load that is not easily reconciled. Virtues, for example, are ethical concepts that have no particular traction in psychological science unless they are conceptualized as traits or habits. Traits and habits are dispositional terms that do not have straightforward or uniform psychological meaning. If character refers to the moral qualities of personality then its explication for purposes of character education will require an account that is compatible with the best insights about psychological functioning and with well-attested models of personality. It will require an account of character that is mindful of its developmental contours (Sokol, Hammond, & Berkowitz, 2010).

Habits, for example, have strong appeal to character educators. Habits are sometimes used as synonyms for virtues and vices, as in the claim that “character is the composite of our good habits, or virtues, and our bad habits, or vices” (Ryan & Bohlin, 1999, p. 9). Persons of good character behave well without much temptation to do otherwise and without much conscious deliberation: “They are good by force of habit” (Ryan & Lickona, 1992, p. 20). This view of habits has important classical sources. In the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle defines the nature of virtues in terms of habituation. On his account we acquire virtues by exercising them. We learn what virtue requires by acting virtuously. One must practice the good if one is to understand the good.

This formulation has invited attempts to understand virtues-as-habits in terms that are compatible with contemporary moral psychology. For example, Steutal and Spiecker (2004) argue that Aristotelian habituation is best understood as a learning-by-doing with regular and consistent practice under the guidance and authority of a virtuous tutor. The habits that emerge from coached practice are settled dispositions to do certain kinds of things on a regular basis but automatically, without reflective choice, deliberation or planning (Steutal & Spiecker, 2004). Social cognitive accounts of moral personality understand the settled dispositions of habits and virtues in terms of social cognitive units
(schemas, prototypes, scripts) that are progressively elaborated as a result of repeated experience, instruction and socialization (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004).

Similarly, Narvaez (2005) argues that the formation of moral character is similar to expertise and skill development. Character development, on her account, is a matter of perfecting component skills to higher level of expertise. Indeed, that virtues are usefully conceptualized as skills is an argument also made increasingly by virtue theorists (Annas, 2011; Jacobson, 2005; Stichter, 2007a, 2007b). Moreover, with coached practice of any skill there develops an increasing intuitive responsiveness that permits rapid, automatic judgments, or behavioral responses to relevant contingencies (Bartsch & Wright, 2005). This would seem to account for the tacit qualities often associated with Aristotelian “habits.” The moral habits of virtue theory are social cognitive schemas or behavioral skills whose frequent activation becomes overlearned to the point of automaticity (Lapsley & Hill, 2008).

**Paradigms**

For the past few decades moral-character education was bifurcated into two traditions, one of moral (ME) and the other of character education (CE). The two traditions are paradigmatic in the sense that each seemed organized around a cluster of related beliefs, commitments, and preferences that are difficult to reconcile. For example, ME and CE orient toward different ethical theories, preferred educational strategies and traditions of liberal education. Table 7.1 summarizes the differences between ME and CE with respect to ethical theory (following G. Watson, 1990).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1 Underlying Ethical Theory for Moral and Character Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethical theory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic of obligation (Kant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key question</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is my duty?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does the moral law require?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic moral facts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is appraised?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What to cultivate?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moral education fashioned around Kantian deontology is one that emphasizes the primacy of reason, judgment, and decision making. The goal of ME is to cultivate powers of reasoning so that one better apprehends what the moral law requires; so that one better knows what one is obliged to do given the exigencies of the case. In contrast CE is aligned with Aristotelian concerns to develop virtuous traits that
conduce to living well the life that is good for one to live. Whereas ME emphasizes the development of reasoning so as to determine what is to be done, CE emphasizes the cultivation of habits and dispositions that allow agents to flourish.

The two paradigms also have preferred pedagogical strategies. Moral education encourages students to actively construct moral meaning by discussion of dilemmas and by engaging in democratic classroom practices that requires the consideration of multiple social perspectives. There are class meetings to discuss rules, infractions, and other occasions of joint decision making. The goal of dialogical social interaction is to encourage a sense of genuine community and positive moral climate whereby students take responsibility for doing good and respecting others (Power, Kohlberg, & Higgins, 1989). Character education, at least traditional character education, does not see the point of this and endorses instead authoritative exhortation of the great tradition or direct instruction about favorite virtues (Wynne, 1997).

Finally, the two paradigms reflect competing options revealed by the history of liberal education. Kimball (1986) argued that liberal education has alternated since antiquity between two distinct traditions, what he called the *philosophical* and *oratorical* traditions. Table 7.2 is a summary of key distinguishing features of these traditions, with ME and CE aligning with the philosophical and oratorical traditions, respectively (following Kimball, 1986).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical tradition</th>
<th>Oratorical tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truth is unsettled and elusive</td>
<td>Truth is found in the great texts and traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The search for truth is an act of discovery</td>
<td>The search for truth is an act of recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education equips for an uncertain future</td>
<td>Education equips with certain verities of the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong on method (Weak on content)</td>
<td>Strong on content (Weak on method)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Education</td>
<td>Character Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The philosophical tradition wants to equip students with the philosophical capacities to reason critically, judge fairly and with an open mind, just because truth is elusive, the future is uncertain and complexities are many. We see through the glass darkly but truth wins out by disciplined philosophical inquiry. The oratorical tradition, in contrast, aims to expose students to classical texts and the wisdom of traditions. One becomes a citizen-orator by acquaintance with the rhetoric of the classics. Truth and goodness is not so much discovered by philosophical inquiry but recovered in the great texts that provide a foundation for the way forward. Kimball (1986) argued that most of the educational controversies of the past century reflect the ongoing debate between these two traditions. Educational reform oscillates between these traditions. Every step toward
progressive innovation is followed by retrenchment to basics so that we keep recycling the same set of educational reforms.

The ME and CE paradigms would seem to align with the philosophical and oratorical traditions of liberal education, respectively. Moreover the two traditions pick up pedagogical preferences for direct (oratorical) and indirect (philosophical) methods. Dewey (1908) defined the debate in this way. It “may be laid down as fundamental,” he asserted, “that the influence of direct moral instruction, even at its very best, is comparatively slight in influence” (p. 4). Dewey was critical of traditional pedagogies of exhortation, didactic instruction and drill, practices that reduces moral instruction to teaching about virtues or instilling certain attitudes in students. Instead what is required is an approach to moral education that links school subjects to a social interest; that cultivates children’s ability to discern, observe, comprehend social situations; that uses methods that appeal to the “active constructive powers” of intelligence; that organizes schools along the lines of a genuine community. This vision of Dewey’s is sometimes called a progressive or indirect approach because it eschews didactic instruction and direct transmission of moral content in favor of approaches that emphasize the child’s active construction of moral meaning through participation in democratic practices, cooperative groupings, social interaction and moral discussion (DeVries & Zan, 1994).

It would seem, then, that debates about the relative merits of CE and ME and direct and indirect methods of instruction reflect much deeper and longer-standing tensions between philosophical and oratorical traditions of liberal education. Featherstone (1986) pointed out that the great strength of the philosophical tradition (ME) is its emphasis on the free exercise of reason in the pursuit of truth, but its weakness is its relative silence on just what is to be taught. It is strong on how to teach, it is strong on method, but weak on what to teach, or content. The oratorical tradition, in turn, has no difficulty with what to teach or the content of instruction—one transmits the classic texts of the great tradition. In the oratorical tradition the goal is to impart the truth not to help students seek it. But herein is its weakness, for the oratorical tradition is strong on content but weak on method. It embraces a set of pedagogical strategies that are ineffective on the evidence of contemporary research in the educational sciences (e.g., Anderson, 1989).

Although these distinctions have considerable heuristic value it is not difficult to see the middle way. For example, with respect to pedagogy our best teachers combine direct and indirect methods and are expert in what Shulman (1987) termed “pedagogical content knowledge” that allow them to map appropriate methods to specific content. As Kristjansson (2002, p. 139) put it, “let us use as many strategies as necessary to make students smart and good.” The best approaches to moral-character education will flexibly balance philosophical
methods of inquiry with oratorical respect for tradition and text. We need both philosophers and orators in moral-character education (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006).

Moreover the distinction between Kantian and Aristotelian ethical theory should not be overemphasized. These formidable ethical frameworks are not entirely incommensurable (Sherman, 1997). In some ways Kant, too, was a virtue theorist, and virtue theory can yield action-guiding prescriptions just like Kantian deontology (Hursthouse, 1999). Paradigmatic distinctions also break down in actual practice. Although Aristotelian virtue theory may inspire the modern resurgence of character education, that does not stop character educators from being just as concerned about right conduct and good judgment as any good deontologist. What’s more some approaches to character education work both sides of the paradigmatic divide. For example, Thomas Lickona endorses a model of CE that that has clear oratorical sympathies that supports direct advocacy of basic, core values, yet also endorse indirect strategies as well, including cooperative learning, conflict resolution, classroom democratic practices, moral discussion and the need to build a moral community within classrooms and schools (Lickona, 1997; Lickona & Davidson, 2004).

**Boundary Issues**

Although paradigmatic distinctions are porous it is not always easy to determine what is to count as MCE. McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) distinguish between CE that is expansive and nonexpansive. Nonexpansive CE consists of programs that have a specific overriding justification (e.g., arresting the cultural decline of society), focus on teaching core universal values and developing moral habits. In contract expansive CE has broader purposes (e.g., civic education), focus on a range of adaptive dispositions beyond a basic core while emphasizing moral reasoning, discussion and community (rather than habit-training). In some ways this restates the paradigmatic distinction between ME and CE noted earlier.

Kristjansson (2002) argued that there are forms of nonexpansive CE worth defending, such as Lickona’s approach. For Kristjansson a defensible nonexpansive form of CE must have at least two features: it must commit to moral cosmopolitanism and to methodological substantivism. Moral cosmopolitanism is the view that there are transcendental moral values that anyone, in any society, in any time or place, could identify; and that these basic moral universals should be the target of intentional character education. Methodological substantivism holds that “the content of the moral truths that are transmitted to students in character education is more important that the process or method by which they are taught” (Kristjansson, 2002, p. 139). Nonexpansive CE, on these two criteria, is distinguished by a commitment to teach a basic set of core moral values by whatever means that is shown to work.
Lapsley and Narvaez (2006) drew a somewhat related distinction between broad and narrow CE; and CE conceived as a treatment or an outcome. Often the case for CE is made on the basis of troubling epidemiological trends on adolescent risk behavior. This way of framing CE is so common that it is almost a literary genre. Character education is needed because there is an epidemic of poor academic achievement, school-dropout, cheating, premarital sex, adolescent pregnancy, and substance use. Adolescents are showing disrespect, using bad language, attempting suicide, and many other forms of irresponsible behavior (Brooks & Goble, 1997). Presumably these risk behaviors bear the mark of poor moral character. Consequently, any program that drives down these trends, that is, programs that encourage school persistence, improves social skills, discourages the use of drugs and alcohol, and prevents sexual activity and pregnancy, and so on, might quality as a moral education program. Indeed, Berkowitz and Bier (2004) identified 12 recommended and 18 promising practices for CE. These practices covered a wide range of purposes, including health education, problem solving, life-skills training, and positive youth development, among others. Yet the language of morality, virtue and character was largely absent from this literature, nor were the various programs described as instances of MCE. But the success of these programs is claimed as a vindication of CE nonetheless because “they are all school based endeavors designed to help foster the positive development of youth” (Berkowitz & Bier, 2004, p. 5). We take up this issue later when we consider “what works” in MCE.

Should CE include health promotion and risk reduction programs? Do school-based interventions of any kind count as CE so long as they yield positive outcomes for youth? The trouble with such a broad conception of MCE is that it does not point to anything distinctive by way of treatment. In the broad sense moral character education might refer to any program that prevents risk behavior or promotes resilience in the case of risk exposure. Of course, these interventions are driven by constructs, theories and literatures (e.g., developmental psychopathology, risk-and-resilience) that make no reference to morality, virtues or character; and the only reason to treat them as instances of MCE at all is because they reduce or prevent problematic behaviors associated with the “rising tide of youth disorder” so commonly thought to reflect the absence of character education in the schools.

But if character education is all of these things then the singularity of CE as an educational program with a distinctive purpose is lost. It becomes instead a catalog of psychosocial interventions and risk prevention programs whose objectives are framed by an entirely different set of theoretical literatures that make no reference to morality, virtue or character. Indeed, “there is little reason to appeal to character education, or use the language of moral valuation, to understand the etiology of risk behavior or how best to prevent or ameliorate
exposure to risk or promote resilience and adjustment” (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006, p. 259).

In the narrow sense MCE has a chiefly moral purpose oriented around fundamental values. It aims to influence children’s capacity or inclination for moral judgment, behavior or emotion. We engage in MCE to inculcate virtues or to orient the dispositional qualities of youngsters towards morally desirable aims for normatively laudable reasons. Hence, to justify MCE in the narrow sense would seem to require facility with ethical theory or require some conception of how practice conduces to the formation of virtuous dispositions. In a previous review we were critical of such an expansive view of CE, and suggested that a program or intervention must have something about morality in the treatment if its good outcomes are to be claimed as vindication for MCE (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006). That said, while it may be controversial to treat school-based prevention programs (e.g., for pregnancy, substance use, violence) as examples of MCE, it may be the case that competent behavior hangs together as a cluster much the way that problem behavior does, and that all good causes in education, whether it be moral character formation or risk reduction, comes down to a common set of instructional practices. In this case it might not matter much if this practice is apportioned to MCE and that one to developmental psychopathology (Berkowitz, Battistich, & Bier, 2008).

So a broad conception of CE links it to any school-based regimen that has positive outcomes. It is agnostic about the treatment, that is, the form of the intervention or its purpose, but claims the outcome for itself. A narrow CE, in contrast, would look like the non-expansive CE defended by Kristjansson (2002). It would be an educational intervention that was sure of its treatment (teaching basic core values as befitting moral cosmopolitanism) and sure of its outcomes (moral or prosocial behavior) but agnostic about methods (as befitting methodological substantivism).

In the remainder of this chapter we review some general approaches to MCE. As noted earlier, however, the tension between expansive and nonexpansive MCE makes it difficult to draw a boundary between what is distinctly the purview of MCE or developmental psychopathology or ordinary best practice instruction. In the next section we take up various theoretical approaches that have guided research on MCE.

---

**Theoretical Approaches**

Three contemporary theoretical approaches have important implications for MCE. Moral stage theory, the domains approach to social reasoning and a more
recent approach that focuses on moral self-identity each propose strategies for advancing socio-moral development.

**Moral Stage Theory**

For several decades the field of moral education was dominated by the cognitive developmental approach to socialization pioneered by Lawrence Kohlberg (1969). According to Kohlberg the form or structure of moral reasoning undergoes a series of developmental transformations as one move from late childhood to early adulthood. These transformations are described in terms of six stages that gradually reveal, at the highest stages, an increasingly sophisticated appreciation of the moral point of view. The sequence of stages is held to be universal, invariant, and descriptive of qualitative changes in justice reasoning (about fairness). Furthermore developmental progression through the stages is said to reflect not only advances in cognitive operations such as perspective taking, but also an advance in the quality of moral reflection as well. Reasoning at the highest stages is both psychologically sophisticated and morally adequate, with moral adequacy judged by how well reasoning aligns with moral philosophic criteria. By explicitly appealing to certain ethical principles (e.g., Kant’s categorical imperative) and by engaging in one of several dilemma-solving tactics (e.g., reasoning from the original position, appealing to procedural justice checks on the validity of reasoning), one increases the likelihood that just solutions will be found that command consensus because of its evident rationality.

Kohlberg (1987, p. 300) argued “the most important validity criterion of a stage test is evidence for it meeting the criterion of invariant sequence.” This implies no stage skipping and no stage regression. The second most important criterion is “structured wholeness.” This implies that reasoning across different kinds of moral dilemmas should coalesce around the same stage. On one account the results of validation research (e.g., Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983) were said to be “spectacular” (Rest, 1985, p. 466). Yet research has also shown that progress through the stages is glacial, and that the incidence of principled reasoning at the highest stage is so rare that it was dropped from the scoring manuals. And not all the evidence was supportive. Kohlberg’s own research team uncovered evidence of stage regression and moral reasoning so heterogeneous across different types of dilemmas that doubts were raised about the validity of the stage model (see Lapsley, 2008, for a review).

So although the empirical status of the moral stage theory was at the center of robust debate it also presented with attractive educational implications (Snarey & Samuelson, 2008). For example, Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) argued that pitching moral arguments one stage above a student’s current level of reasoning could induce movement in the direction of the next highest stage. This technique became known as the plus-one convention (or the Blatt effect) and it generated widespread
use of classroom dilemma-discussion as a prototypic moral education strategy (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). Discussion of moral dilemmas was most effective when it induced cognitive conflict and disagreement and when arguments were within a stage (possibly just half stage) of students’ general level of moral understanding (Schaefli, Rest, & Thoma, 1985). This optimal range of stage disparity is probably within reach of well-led class discussions and no special stage tracking by teachers is required (Berkowitz, Gibbs, & Broughton, 1980). But the quality of discussion matters as much as its stage content. For example, discussion that is transactive, that is, discussion that operates on the reasoning of another by extending its logic, undermining its claims, integrating its perspective, and so on, is the engine that drives moral development (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983; Lapsley, Enright, & Serlin, 1989).

In addition to student discussion of topical moral dilemmas the Kohlberg team also encouraged schools to engage students in democratic practices that would establish and defend shared normative expectations and adjudicate conflict (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989). Kohlberg was inspired by Durkheim’s (1925) view that groups take on emergent properties that are not the mere sum of group members; and that groups are the primary context for socialization. Groups create and sustain a moral culture that influences how individuals understand rules and norms. Hence moral education for Kohlberg and his team was not simply a matter of increasing the decision-making competence of adolescents, but also required transforming schools into communities where justice permeates the moral atmosphere (Kohlberg, 1985, 1987).

The chief mechanism for effecting school-wide change in moral atmosphere is to give students a stake in the conduct of the school. In three schools the Kohlberg team pioneered an intervention that involved weekly meetings to discuss norms, rules and infractions. Students and parents were put on important committees and there was broad collaboration among educators, students and parents that aimed for consensus and democratic participation. The strategy follows Dewey’s 1908 instruction that “The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life” (p. 15); and that the school has no moral aim apart from participation in the “agencies, instrumentalities and materials of school life” (p. 15). The school must become an “embryonic typical community” where democratic practices sharpen the “vital moral education” required for participation in larger society.

Hence the just community approach combines Durkheim’s views on the power of group socialization with Dewey’s conception of democratic participation as the lever of meaningful moral education. It was informed also by Piaget’s (1932) views concerning the development of autonomous morality within a society of equals. The developmental flavor is captured by three underappreciated constructs that Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg (1989) introduced in their seminal
investigation to map the transformation of school culture: *level of institutional valuing, stages of community valuing* and *phases of the collective norm*.

Level of institutional caring charts the degree to which students value their school as an institution. At Level 0 ("Rejection") the school is not valued; at Level 1 ("Instrumental Extrinsic Valuing") the school is valued to the extent it meets a student’s needs; at Level 2 ("Enthusiastic Identification") the school is valued at special moments when students feel particularly identified with the school; at Level 3 ("Spontaneous Community") the school is valued as a place where students feel a sense of closeness and connection to others and are motivated to help them; at Level 4 ("Normative Community") the school is valued for its own sake, and can obligate its members to uphold group norms and responsibilities.

Whereas the first construct described levels in students’ valuation of the school as an institution, the second construct charted stages in students’ valuing of the community. At the lowest level there is no clear sense of community other than as a collection of individuals who do things for each other for concrete, instrumental reasons; then the sense of community emerges on the basis of shared friendships and relationships; and finally the community is considered as an entity apart from specific relationships. At this third stage the community is something one enters on terms of a social contract to respect the norms and ideals of the group.

The third construct describes the evolution of collective norms within the community. At first there is no collective norm, but then, over successive phases, a collective norm is proposed, accepted as an ideal, held out as an expectation for behavior, and then deemed regulative of conduct. In the final phases the collective norm is enforced through persuasion and then by reporting. Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg (1989) argued that a school’s moral community is revealed by the development of its collective norms. How willing are members to uphold collective norms, to defend them, to confront violators, to take responsibility for enacting the norm within the life of the school? When hammered out in school meetings a moral community gradually comes to understand collective norms to be “ours” rather than as rules imposed by authority from without (“theirs”), and community members are more committed to abide by them as a result.

Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg (1989) showed that students in schools run on the just community model were more advanced than students in comparison schools on the three moral culture variables. Moreover, there was significant (but modest) growth in moral reasoning and improvements in moral behavior. There may be improvements as well in the civic competence of students insofar as it hones the skills required for effective participation in democratic processes and civic affairs (Power & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2008). Other studies showed that perceived moral atmosphere was linked to lower incidents of adolescent misbehavior and higher incidence of prosocial behavior (Brugman et al., 2003);
and that schools that practice just community can be distinguished from comparison schools on several dimensions of moral culture (Host, Brugman, Tavecchio, & Bream, 1998).

This promising evidence aside just-community education has never quite taken off and, as a movement, “is now almost extinct” (Davis, 2003, p. 35). Power and Higgins-D’Alessandro (2008) note at least three reasons for this. First, transforming schools into just communities requires radical reform of the structure and practices of schools and these are not easy to do. Second, many educators resist turning over the school to student democratic decision making. Third, effective implementation requires substantial investment in teacher professional development to ensure buy-in and fidelity to the aims and goals of the model. Moreover many educators are reluctant to give up much of the instructional day to meetings given widespread anxiety about producing adequate yearly progress on high stakes academic achievement tests. Moral culture, it seems, has given way to testing culture.

Although just community programs as a whole-school reform have not gotten traction, key features of the model, such as class meetings, giving students “voice-and-choice,” encouraging moral discussion, improving students sense of connection to teachers and schools, encouraging a sense of community, are now de rigueur in most accounts of effective schools (Blum, 2005; National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, 2004) and effective character education (Davidson, Lickona, & Khmelkov, 2008; Lickona, Schaps, & Lewis, 2003). Payne, Gottfredson, and Gottfredson (2003) showed, for example, that schools characterized by communal organization—mutually supportive relationships among teachers, administrators and students, a sense of collaboration, and commitment to common goals and norms—tended to have students who reported attachment to school, a sense of belonging, and belief in the legitimacy of rules and norms.

Indeed, youth who feel connected to school are less likely to be delinquent, use substances, initiate early sexual activity or engage in violent behavior. They are more likely to report higher levels of academic motivation and lower levels of physical and emotional distress (Battistich, 2008; Elias, Parker, Kash, Weissberg, & O’Brien, 2008; Hawkins et al. 1996). And the benefits of school connectedness have longer term effects. Data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health showed that the sense of belonging to school predicted less depressive symptoms, social rejection, and school problems; and greater optimism and higher grades one year later (Anderman, 2002). Similar findings were reported by Loukas, Ripperger-Suhler, and Horton (2009). In their study, middle school adolescents who reported low levels of school connectedness showed increases in conduct problems one year later. Low connectedness in late middle school was also associated with greater anxiety, depressive symptoms and marijuana use in high school and one-year post–high school (Bond et al., 2007).
School connectedness can also buffer the negative effects of poor parenting (Loukas, Roalson, & Herrera, 2010).

These studies point to several conclusions. First, the core features of just community approaches to MCE have been taken up by literatures that underscore the importance of students’ perception of community, communal organization and connectedness. Second, although these literatures do not often invoke the mantle of MCE, they do address psychological (e.g., mental health) and behavioral (e.g., risk and prosocial behavior) outcomes that are of interest to many character educators. Finally, these findings support an emerging consensus, one driven partly by developmental contextualism and by social cognitive theories of personality, that moral failure is not simply the result of disordered private virtue (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006). Dispositions and settings interact in complex ways, and a stable behavioral signature is to be found at the intersection of person by context interactions (Cervone & Shoda, 1999). This suggests that MCE must attend to the social and communal contexts of teaching and learning as much as to the personal dispositions of students.

**Social Domain Theory**

Kohlberg’s moral stage theory once drove the agenda in cognitive developmental accounts of socialization but no longer. The moral stage theory traded importantly on Piaget’s paradigm to articulate its core constructs, such as structure, stage and sequence; but as Piaget’s theory became increasingly eclipsed by alternative accounts of intellectual development, it was not for long that Kohlberg’s theory followed it to the margins of developmental science (Lapsley, 2006). But loss of paradigmatic support is not the only explanation. Kohlberg’s theory was also troubled by longitudinal data that presented it with prima facie empirical refutation.

Kramer (1968) reported, for example, that adolescents who were once classified at the principled levels (Stage 5 and Stage 6) in high school were found to embrace a kind of relativism more characteristic of Stage 2 on entering college. This is a problem because Kohlberg’s stage model forbids regression to earlier (and presumably rejected) stage reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969). Indeed, as noted earlier, Kohlberg (1987) argued that the validity of the moral stage model rested almost entirely on claims for invariant sequence (and on the structured wholeness assumption, which also faced empirical challenges). Hence these data presented Kohlberg with a prima facie refutation of his moral stage theory.

However, on further examination of the protocols (and with new scoring procedures) Kohlberg concluded that the relativism of the university students was quite different from the concrete-individualistic thinking of Stage 2 subjects. The university subjects seemed to be wrestling with relativism as part of an overall
moral theory. Although these subjects were once considered principled reasoners in high school, their reasoning could not now be considered principled (because it embraced relativism), though it seemed more sophisticated than conventional reasoning (because it was theoretical). Hence Kohlberg deemed their reasoning to be at a transitional stage 4 ½ (Kohlberg, 1973, 1984; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). But the appearance of a transition stage forced other revisions. For example, if transitional stage subjects were wrestling with relativistic moral notions but in a theoretical way, should not we also expect principled subjects to be even more theoretical in their moral reflection?

That’s indeed how the Kohlberg team saw it. Hence, the principled stages (5 and 6) were now redefined in a philosophic-theoretical way (but with the consequence that Stage 6 receded from empirical view—hardly anyone, other than professional ethicists, reason like that), and the theoretical discourse of transitional Stage 4 ½ subjects was downsized into a species of conventional reasoning. To make room for theoretical, universalizing language at the conventional level required the creation of A and B substages. The traditional description of conventional reasoning was relegated to the A substage, while the more theoretical kind was now denoted as substage B. The B substage reflects a better appreciation of the prescriptive and universalizable nature of moral judgments, and is oriented toward fairness, equality, and reciprocity. In turn, the A substage was linked with the heteronomous orientation to rules, authority, conventions. This means that the B substage is more “equilibrated” that the A substage, and that moral development can now be said to occur within stage (e.g., moving from Stage 3A to 3B) as well as between stages. Curiously, principled reasoning became at once increasingly rare (with the elimination of Stage 6) but more common (seeping down into the B substages of conventional reasoning).

But some scholars thought that the addition of A and B substages signaled something wrong with the analysis of morality and convention. This was the view of Elliot Turiel (1975, 1977) who began a line of research that identified moral and conventional reasoning as distinct conceptual domains. On his account what the Kohlberg team was picking up with A and B substages was not the fact that sometimes conventional reason (“A”) was sometimes prescriptive and universalizing (“B”), but rather that children were trying to coordinate two different conceptual domains. The moral domain and the conventional domain are very different and, as later research would show, even young children know it (Smetana, 1983; Turiel, 1983).

The distinctiveness of moral and conventional reasoning is revealed when children are presented with moral and social dilemmas and asked a series of questions: would a behavior (“hitting”) be okay if there was no rule to prohibit it? If an authority says that it is okay to do it? Is it okay if people in another country do it? What domain analysis reveals is that moral rules are judged to be unalterable generalizable and universal, and not contingent on the views of
authority. No one can change moral rules no matter how powerful; nor can moral rules be changed by taking a vote or waived because one is from another culture or society. Conventional rules, in contrast, are arbitrary and open to change by consensus. While there are sanctions for violations of conventions, these are not judged as serious as violations of moral rules. Moreover, violations of moral rules evoke strong emotion whereas violations of convention do not (e.g., Arsenio & Lover, 1995).

According to domain theory the emergence of separate domains of reasoning for morality and convention is the result of qualitatively different kinds of experiences. Morality points to actions that bear on intrinsic harm, on the welfare of others and on matters of interpersonal obligation. Conventions focus on rules and norms that make social organizations work, including schools, communities and families (Turiel, 1983). Hitting, hurting, stealing, affronting another’s dignity and personal worth—these are matters for morality. Whether we address teachers by their first names, go up the down staircase, or respect the 10 p.m. curfew are matters for school and family convention.

According to domain theory, Kohlberg got it wrong when he posited a conventional level of moral reasoning that would be supplanted by a later occurring postconventional level. Conventional reasoning and moral reasoning is not something that is differentiated only at advanced stages of development. Conventional reasoning is not a developmental way station on the steady progress towards principled reasoning. It is not an impoverished and immature form of moral reasoning that is developmentally “lower” on the stage sequence—it is, instead, a conceptually distinct domain. Moreover, it is the independence of morality from conventions that vouchsafes claims against ethical relativism, in contrast to Kohlberg’s view that ethical relativism is defeated only at the highest level of moral reasoning. Put differently, for domain theory, ethical relativism is defeated because of (moral and conventional) domain distinctiveness; for Kohlberg, it is defeated because of (moral) stage development.

A distinct personal domain was identified by Larry Nucci (1996, 2008). Private aspects of one’s life and behaviors that affect no one but the self are thought not to invoke considerations of interpersonal moral obligation or social regulation but instead fall within a zone of personal discretion. What books to read or music to enjoy, how to dress and groom, what friends to choose, whether to masturbate or not—these are choices and preferences that resist social regulation and the demands of deontic obligation. The personal domain includes decisions about one’s own body and about self-expression and all the things that make fall under the heading of the “pursuit of happiness.” Nucci (1996) argued that the construction of a personal zone of privacy and discretion establishes the boundary between agency and communion, between self and others, and is critical to the establishment of a sense of rights-as-freedom and of personal autonomy and
identity, insofar as self-conception and identity are grounded on the things we prefer and the choices we make.

While Piaget’s theory is on the margins most everywhere else it is sometimes forgotten just how Piagetian is domain theory. The boundaries of moral, conventional and personal domains are partial structures that are constructed on the basis of certain behavioral experiences. This is precisely the way Piaget described the emergence of domains of conservation (for example). For Piaget cognitive groupings are based on overt actions that have become interiorized, made part of mental cognitive activity—but groupings always retain an element of content specificity just because they are based on different kinds of overt actions (Chapman, 1988). For example, the conservation of physical quantity derives from interiorized actions of manipulating objects—putting objects together, taking them apart, and transforming their shape, and so on. But the mental operations in the conservation of weight are very different because they pertain to overt acts of a different sort, in this case, weighing. Each grouping of operations is adaptive for its particular content, and some actions are easier to group than others (which accounts for horizontal decalage). The construction of social domains seems to follow the logic of the construction of conservation domains. Social domains (moral, conventional, personal) arise as interiorized cognitive constructions of behavioral experiences of certain kinds, and in a manner analogous to the construction of conservation domains (quantity, weight, volume).

But social domain boundaries are often unguarded. The boundaries between the moral, conventional and personal are elastic, porous, and open to framing, disagreement, and negotiation. Although prototype cases (e.g., hitting and addressing teachers by first names) are more easily distinguished, even at very young ages, wide swaths of our social life are not so easily sorted into one domain or the other. Although domain overlap is sometimes thought to count against the usefulness of domain theory (Rest, 1983), it also points out that some situations (e.g., hitting another person) require the application of only one social knowledge system (in this case, morality), while others involve the intersection of fairness and human welfare with considerations of social convention; while still others involve the intrusion of social convention on matters one considers strictly personal (Nucci, 2008). What makes a case hard is the fact that it is saturated with moral, conventional and personal considerations that must be unpacked and coordinated; and herein lies the educational implications of domain theory.

Nucci (2001, 2008; cf., Keefer, 2006) believes that values education should be sensitive to domain distinctions. After all, each domain is a bounded structure with its own normative source. Too often the teaching of social values is not aligned with students’ differentiated understanding of morality and convention, with issues of great complexity being reduced simply to its moral component. But it is domain inappropriate to moralize about conventional (and personal) domain violations and to treat moral considerations as social conventions or as matters of
strictly personal discretion. Even issues such as premarital sexuality or drug usage involve a mélange of moral, conventional and personal considerations that have to be unpacked (Nucci, Guerra, & Lee, 1991).

Take the matter of peer inclusion and exclusion as another example. Wrapping this complicated issue solely in the discourse of morality will be ineffective because it taps into multiple social reasoning domains (Horn, Daddis, & Killen, 2008). It taps into student conventions about group membership and functioning (“The group won’t work well with someone different in it”), personal concerns about friendship selection (“I can be friends with whoever I want”) and moral concerns about fairness, harm and discrimination (“It’s not fair to exclude him just because he is gay”).

Most children and adolescents oppose peer exclusion as wrong and for moral reasons of unfairness or discrimination, but there are many complications. For example, younger adolescents are more likely to endorse exclusion than are older adolescents, and they typically invoke peer group norms (conventional domain) or personal prerogative (personal domain) in doing so (Horn, 2003; Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999). Exclusion is deemed more legitimate in intimate contexts involving friendship and dating than less intimate contexts, such as school clubs and extracurricular activities (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002; Killen, Stangor, Price, Horn, & Sechrist, 2004). When relevant information about a peer is missing, many adolescents resort to stereotypes and ingroup bias to make judgments about the acceptability of inclusion or exclusion—individuals who better fit normative expectations about what a good group member is like are more likely to be included (Killen & Stangor, 2001). Pick the girl for the ballet troupe over the boy; exclude the girl from the wrestling team. Exclusion is more likely if a person violates normative assumptions regarding gender, sexuality and race (Horn, 2007; Killen et al., 2002). The status of one’s peer group also influences judgments of inclusion-exclusion. Members of high status peer groups (e.g., jocks) think better of exclusion and of the legitimacy of the social system that rewards them with status and prestige than do members of low-status groups (e.g., goths), who more likely condemn the legitimacy of the social hierarchy on moral grounds (Horn, 2006).

The issues surrounding inclusion and exclusion in children and adolescents’ group illustrate the complexities of domain overlap in useful ways. It also illustrates how context (e.g., school setting) and developmental status interpenetrates issues of morality and convention. Horn et al. (2008) argue that the construction of normative expectations about group membership helps adolescents assert and defend nascent understanding of self and identity, which is a salient developmental task of adolescence. Who am I, where do I fit, what am I like and similar identity questions are not asked in a vacuum but in a social context riven with concerns about peer group membership, status and friendship. Similarly it is in the context of peer groups that a growing need for autonomy is expressed, and
in terms of personal prerogative (e.g., who to be friends with). As Horn et al. (2008) put it:

In early and middle adolescence individuals are coming to a more complex understanding of the nature and function of social groups, group conventions and norms, as well as their own emerging identities and their sense of personal prerogative and autonomy and as a result they begin to use the peer group context as a place to test out and to make sense of these new understandings. (p. 279)

For these good developmental reasons do young adolescents give priority to group functioning and group norms, and personal prerogative, over moral considerations of harm, discrimination and fairness when it comes to peer inclusion-exclusion.

Finally, domain theory has implications for disciplinary practices. Research shows that teachers who make domain-inappropriate responses to student transgression undermine their credibility as socialization agents among both preschool (Killen, Breton, Ferguson, & Handler, 1994) and grade school age children (Nucci, 2008). Insofar as most classroom misbehavior involves violations of convention, it would be a mistake to moralize about these transgressions. For one thing it diminishes the force of moral argument when it is sent chasing after matters of convention; but it also misses opportunities to engage student thinking about legitimate issues of classroom or school convention (Nucci).

**Moral Self-Identity**

Moral-character education presumably intends to influence the personality of children; or to leave its mark in a way that canalizes a disposition to morality; or else cultivate those ethical virtues that conduce to living well the life that is good for one to live. Character can be considered the moral dimension of personality, and many writers have drawn a tight connection between morality and self-identity (Flanagan & Rorty, 1990). As Taylor (1989) put it, “being a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral issues” (p. 112). As a result there has been much interest in exploring the literatures of self-identity and personality for insights about moral functioning and for MCE (Blasi, 1993, 2005; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Lapsley, 2008; Lapsley & Hill, 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Walker & Frimer, 2009).

The moral self was not entirely absent in the theoretical views presented earlier. For example, Power (2004) argues that a moral self emerges in the context of a just community. One’s sense of identification with the group and its communal norms will generate a moral atmosphere that either conduces to moral formation or undermines it. Hence moral self-identity is a matter of group identification and shared commitment to its value-laden norms. The moral self
identifies with the community by speaking on behalf of its shared norms and by taking on its obligations as binding on the self.

But this might happen in phases. In an early phase (following Blasi, 1988), one simply acknowledges that one is a member of a group and is bound thereby to group norms (Identity Observed). Then, one speaks up more actively in defense of a group norm, and in urging the community to abide by its commitments (Identity Managed). Finally, one takes “legislative responsibility for constructing group norms” (Power, 2004, p. 55; Identity Constructed). Power (2004) argues that the democratic process challenges members to “appropriate” community group membership into one’s personal identity.

Social domain theory also invokes the language of self-identity. Although Nucci (2004) is skeptical of moral self-identity or moral personality as constructs, he argues that the establishment of selfhood, individuality and agency is advanced as young children begin to carve out personal prerogatives and a zone of privacy. Put differently, the development of self emerges apace with the construction of the personal domain. And we have seen how young adolescents test notions of identity and autonomy in the group norms and conventions that govern peer inclusion-exclusion (Horn et al., 2008).

But many researchers are looking for a more robust account of the moral dimensions of selfhood and identity. After all, the personal domain presumes a person, and persons are more than the sum of domain coordinations. Although allowance is made for the emergence of self in the construction of the personal domain, it could well be asked how dimensions of personality—moral identity, the moral self, the virtuous character—influences the way domain knowledge is deployed or coordinated; or how the deployment of social domain knowledge folds back into one’s changing conceptions of who I am and what my life means. It is likely that what is seen in the social landscape depends importantly on who we are. Whether the landscape is moralized or personalized, whether the case is straightforward or ambiguous—depends on the qualities of seeing that are afforded by the person we are or aspire to be, that is, by the qualities of our character.

Blasi (1984, 1993) has written many searching things about the moral personality, and his work is foundational to the moral psychology of self-identity. According to Blasi a moral personality emerges when the sense of self is constructed on the basis of moral commitments. For these individuals moral notions are central, essential, and important to self-understanding. Moral commitments cut deeply to the core of what and who they are as persons. But not everyone constructs the self by reference to moral categories. For some individuals moral considerations do not penetrate their understanding of who they are as persons; nor influence their outlook on important issues; nor “come to mind” when faced with the innumerable transactions of daily life. Some have only a glancing
acquaintance with morality but choose to define the self by reference to other priorities; or else incorporate morality into their personality in different degrees; or emphasize some moral considerations (“justice”) but not others (“caring”).

Hence moral identity is a dimension of individual differences, which is to say, it is a way of talking about personality. One has a moral identity to the extent that moral notions, such as being good, being just, compassionate or fair, is judged to be central, essential and important to one’s self-understanding. One has a moral identity when one strives to keep faith with identity-defining moral commitments; and when moral claims stake out the very terms of reference for the sort of person one claims to be. Moreover, if moral considerations are crucial to the essential self, then self-integrity will hinge on whether one is self-consistent in action. And failing to act in a way that is self-consistent with what is central, essential and important to one’s moral identity is to risk self-betrayal (Hardy & Carlo, 2005).

In his analysis of moral character Blasi (2005) distinguishes higher and lower-order virtues. Lower-order virtues are the many specific traits that show up in many character educators’ favored list of core values: empathy, honesty, compassion, kindness, diligence, and so on. Higher-order traits come in two clusters. One cluster Blasi called “willpower” (or self-control). Willpower as self-control is a toolbox of skills that permit self-regulation in problem-solving. Breaking down problems, goal-setting, focusing attention, avoiding distractions, resisting temptation, staying on task, persevering with determination and self-discipline—these are the skills of willpower. Davidson et al. (2008) would call it performance character.

The second cluster of higher-order traits are organized around the notion of integrity, which refers to internal self-consistency. Being a person of one’s word, being transparent to oneself, being responsible, self-accountable, sincere, resistant to self-deception—these are the dispositions of integrity. Integrity is felt as responsibility when we constrain the self with intentional acts of self-control in the pursuit of our moral aims. Integrity is felt as identity when we imbue the construction of self-meaning with moral desires. When constructed in this way living out one’s moral commitments does not feel like a choice but is felt instead as a matter of self-necessity. This suggests that self-control and integrity are morally neutral but take on significance for moral character only when they are attached to moral desires. Our self-control and integrity are moralized by our desire to keep faith with morality.

Blasi’s rich theoretical claims have yet to be translated into sustained empirical research, yet there are lines of research that do encourage the general thrust of his work. For example, moral identity is used to explain the motivation of individuals who sheltered Jews during the Nazi Holocaust (Monroe, 1994, 2001, 2003). The study of “moral exemplars”—adults whose lives are marked by extraordinary moral commitment--- reveal a sense of self that is aligned with
moral goals, and moral action undertaken as a matter of felt necessity rather than as a product of effortful deliberation (Colby & Damon, 1992). Similar findings are reported in studies of youth. In one study adolescents who were nominated by community organizations for their uncommon prosocial commitment (“care exemplars”) were more likely to include moral goals and moral traits in their self-descriptions than were matched comparison adolescents (Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer, 2003).

Moral exemplars also show more progress in adult identity development (Matsuba & Walker, 2004), and report self-conceptions that are replete with agentic themes, ideological depth and complexity (Matsuba & Walker, 2005). In a study of exemplars who won the Canadian Caring Award or the Medal of Bravery, Walker and Frimer (2009) showed that there was a foundational core to moral exemplarity that distinguished them from matched controls. For example, in an analysis of integrative life review narratives (following McAdams, 1993), exemplars reported more evidence of agentic and communal themes than did controls, a greater tendency to reframe critical life events in terms of redemption (e.g., when a demonstrably negative state leads to a positive one; or when the initial negative state is redeemed or salvaged in some way); and to see early life advantages in terms of secure attachments and the presence of helpers.

Daniel Hart (2005) articulated a developmental systems model of moral identity that is distinctive for its account of the factors that influence moral identity formation. Five factors are arrayed into two groups (that differ on the basis of volitional control). The first group includes (1) enduring dispositional and (2) social (including family, culture, social class) characteristics that change slowly and are probably beyond the volitional control of the developing child. As Hart (2005, p. 179) put it, “Enduring personality characteristics, one’s family, one’s culture and location in a social structure, all shape moral life.” But these things are beyond the control of the child. Children do not select their personality traits; they do not select their home environments or neighborhood, though these settings will influence the contour of their moral formation. As a result, there is a certain moral luck (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1971) involved in the way one’s moral life goes depending on the favorability of the one’s ecological circumstances—including the goodness of fit between one’s enduring personality dispositions and the contextual settings of development.

The second group includes (3) moral judgment and attitudes, (4) the sense of self (including commitment to ideals) and (5) opportunities for moral action. These factors are closer to the volitional control of the agent and introduce more malleability and plasticity in moral identity formation. Not surprisingly they also hold the most promise for MCE. Indeed, the moral exemplar (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992) and systems (Hart, 2005) approach to moral self-identity lead to similar educational recommendations.
For example, moral exemplar research holds out as a goal the sort of prosocial commitment exhibited by care exemplars. But how do individuals come to align personal goals with moral ones; or come to identify the self with ideal goals? Colby and Damon (1992) nominate social influence as a decisive mechanism. The key, in their view, is for young people to become absorbed by social networks that have moral goals. Social influence plays a decisive role in transforming personal goals into important moral commitments. It provides a context for reappraisal of one’s current capabilities, guidance on how best to extend one’s capabilities and the strategies required to pull it off. “For those who continually immerse themselves in moral concerns and in social networks absorbed by such concerns, goal transformation remains the central architect of progressive change throughout life” (Colby & Damon, 1995, p. 344).

Similarly, Hart’s (2005) research illustrates the importance of cultivating attachment to organizations that provide social opportunities for young people to engage their communities in prosocial service. There is a significant literature that documents the salutary effect of participation in voluntary organizations and service learning opportunities more generally on prosocial behavior and moral civic identity (C. Flanagan, 2004; Youniss & Yates, 1997, 1999). Connecting young people with prosocial institutions and giving them opportunities for moral engagement with their community may be crucial components of effective MCE. The challenge for MCE is figure out how to transform the culture of schools into places where social networks are absorbed by moral concerns, where attachment to school is encouraged and where opportunities abound for broad participation in voluntary associations that permit prosocial engagement in the school and community (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006).

Thus far we have treated MCE as something that takes place in schools. In fact MCE is also the province of families and of early life experience and it is here where the foundation of moral personality, character and selfhood are first laid down. We examine the early roots of moral formation later in the chapter, but two additional developmental theories inform the question of moral identity. The first concerns the development of conscience (Kochanska, 2002; Kochanska & Aksan, 2004). The second concerns the early development of moral personality (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005, 2009). We take up only the matter of conscience here because of its more direct implication for MCE.

Conscience. One important feature of Blasi’s theory is his insistence that one’s character is defined mostly by what one cares about. A moral character cares about morality. A moral character has the self-reflective capacity to reflect upon one’s desires and motives, to form judgments and desires with respect to them. Indeed, the character virtues of self-control and integrity take on significance, that is, become moralized, only when attached to moral desires. What is the developmental source of such desiring?
We think Kochanka’s (2002) work on the development of conscience is a good place to start. Her model of emerging morality begins with the quality of parent-child attachment. A strong, mutually responsive relationship with caregivers orients the child to be receptive to parental influence (Kochanska, 1997). This “mutually responsive orientation” (MRO) is characterized by shared positive affect, mutually coordinated enjoyable routines (“good times”) and a “cooperative interpersonal set” that describes the joint willingness of parent and child to initiate and reciprocate relational overtures. It is from within the context of the MRO, and the secure attachment that it denotes, that the child is eager to comply with parental expectations and standards. It encourages wholehearted, willing and committed compliance on the part of the child to the norms and values of caregivers, which, in turn, motivates moral internalization and the work of “conscience.” This was documented in a recent longitudinal study. Children who had experienced a highly responsive relationship with mothers over the first 24 months of life strongly embraced maternal prohibitions and gave evidence of strong self-regulation skills at preschool age (Kochanksa, Aksan, Prisco, & Adams, 2008).

Kochanska’s model moves, then, from security of attachment (MRO) to committed compliance to moral internalization. This movement is also expected to influence the child’s emerging internal representation of the self. As Kochanska et al. (2002) put it:

Children with a strong history of committed compliance with the parent are likely gradually to come to view themselves as embracing the parent’s values and rules. Such a moral self, in turn, comes to serve as the regulator of future moral conduct and, more generally, of early morality. (p. 340)

Lapsley and Narvaez (2006) argued that the source of wholehearted commitment to morality required by Blasi’s moral desiring may lie in the mutually responsive orientation that characterizes secure interpersonal attachments. The moral self emerges in the context of these relationships; and the developmental source of integrity, self-control and moral desires is deeply relational. If the Kochanska model of early morality can be generalized it would underscore the importance of school bonding (Catalano, Haggerty, Oesterle, Fleming, & Hawkins, 2004), of caring school communities (Solomon, Watson, Battistich, Schaps, & Delucchi, 1996) and attachment to teachers (Watson, 2003) as a basis for prosocial moral development, and as important features of MCE.
Programmatic Approaches

In this section we briefly review several programmatic approaches that seem to yield empirically supported outcomes that are relevant to MCE. First we begin with an overview of the principles of effective character education advocated by the Character Education Partnership, and then we examine programs endorsed by the “what works” evaluation literature.

CEP Principles

The Character Education Partnership (CEP) is a coalition of organizations and individuals dedicated to helping schools develop moral and character education programs. The CEP developed eleven principles of effective character education (Beland, 2003). The first principle asserts that good character is built on the foundation of core ethical values, such as caring, honesty, fairness, responsibility and respect. What is critical is that the values selected for character education be universally valid, promote the common good, affirm human dignity, contribute to the welfare of the individual, deal with issues of right and wrong, facilitate democratic practices.

Accordingly, programs should teach core values holistically with cognitive, affective and behavioral components (Principle 2), and in a way that engages school personnel in an intentional, proactive and comprehensive way (Principle 3). It is particularly important to create caring school communities (Principle 4) and to provide students with opportunities to engage in moral action, such as service learning and community service (Principle 5). Effective character education does not neglect rigorous, challenging academic curriculum (Principle 6). It fosters intrinsic motivation to do the right thing by building a climate of trust and respect; by encouraging a sense of autonomy; and by building shared norms through dialogue, class meetings and democratic decision-making (Principle 7). Moreover, the core values that animate student life should engage the school staff as well (Principle 8). Furthermore for character education to take root it must result in shared educational leadership that makes provision for long-term support of the initiative (Principle 9); it must engage families and community stakeholders (Principle 10); and be committed to on-going assessment and evaluation (Principle 11).

This remarkable set of principles provides a useful guidepost for the design and implementation of intentional, programmatic and comprehensive character education. It insists that ethical considerations be the transparent rationale for programmatic activities and, on this basis (e.g., Principle 3), would not support efforts to broaden the definition of character education to include all manner of
prevention and intervention programs absent an explicit, intentional concern for moral development. It endorses a set of well-attested pedagogical strategies that are considered educational best practice, including cooperative learning, democratic classrooms, and constructivist approaches to teaching and learning. It endorses practices that cultivate autonomy, intrinsic motivation and community engagement. Indeed, the CEP Principles look more like the blueprint for progressive education, and would seem to settle the historical debate concerning direct and indirect approaches to character education in favor of the latter paradigm.

**What Works?**

**What Works Clearinghouse**

The Institute for Educational Sciences (IES) of the U.S. Department of Education maintains a What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) that catalogs the empirical evidence on the efficacy of educational interventions and curricula, including character education. For the WWC, character refers to moral and ethical qualities as these are demonstrated in emotions, reasoning, and behavior. It is associated with core virtues such as respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship; and CE refers to school-based programs that are designed to positively influence behavior associated with these qualities. Moreover CE is defined in a way that excludes single-minded focus on single risk behaviors (e.g., drug usage) or competency (conflict resolution) in favor of instructional activities that focus on values that generalize across contexts. Example include values that attach to **persons** (honesty, courage, perseverance, self-discipline, responsibility, integrity); to **relationships** (caring, respect, empathy, fairness, tolerance); and to **civic virtues** (good citizenship, patriotism, justice).

These core values are assumed to have cognitive, emotional and behavioral components, and these should show improvement as a result of CE. Hence, students should come to know what values mean, how to reason about them, and how to sort through the value implications of ethical dilemmas. There is also an emotional dimension. Students should care about values and have certain attitudes and feelings with respect to them. Values should influence behavior. Students must display behavior that reflects a commitment to core values, either as prosocial behavior for the benefit of peers or the community, or as a reduction in risk behavior. In short, CE must result in character development whereby students come to understand values, care about them, and enact them in behavior. To this end the WWC groups student outcomes in its evaluation of CE into the three domains of (1) knowledge, attitudes and values and (2) behavior; and adds a third domain of (3) academic achievement.
To be included in the WWC a character education intervention must be a *program*, a *practice* or *strategy* or a *policy* and one that passes an exacting evidence protocol. For example, evaluation studies must use randomized trials or quasi-experimental designs with strong controls, and to have been conducted within the last 20 years using K-12 students between the ages of 5 and 21. Outcome measures must have adequate levels of internal consistency (.60), temporal stability/test-retest (.40) and interrater reliability (.50). Evidence on subgroups (e.g., age, grade, gender, disability status, ethno-racial classification, at-risk and SES status) must be available. There must not be differential attrition from the intervention and control groups (< 7% is deemed unproblematic), and the overall attrition from the study sample must not be severe (< 20% is deemed minimal).

These screening criteria exclude many programs from consideration (and WWC does not evaluate the even larger domain of character education products, such as curricular workbooks, videos and CD-ROMs). For interventions that pass muster the WWC rates program effectiveness as: positive, potentially positive, mixed, no discernible effects, potentially negative, or negative. These ratings are based on four factors: (1) the quality of the research design, (2) the statistical significance of the findings *as calculated by the WWC*, (3) the size of the difference between participants in the intervention condition and the comparison conditions, and (4) the consistency of the findings across studies.

Table 7.3 is a summary of program effectiveness across outcome variables for the 13 programs (out of 41) that meet the screening protocol. The first thing to notice is that after decades of visibility as an educational priority only 13 programs make the evidentiary cut to be included in the WWC.

### Table 7.3 What Works Clearinghouse: Character Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Knowledge, attitudes, values</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Academic achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building decision skills (with service learning)</td>
<td>Potentially positive</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>No report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child development project</td>
<td>No discernible effect</td>
<td>Potentially positive</td>
<td>No discernible effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connect with kids</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>Potentially positive</td>
<td>No report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too good for drugs</td>
<td>No discernible effect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too good for violence</td>
<td>Potentially positive</td>
<td>Potentially positive</td>
<td>No report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too good for drugs &amp; violence</td>
<td>Positive effects</td>
<td>No report</td>
<td>No report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heartland ethics</td>
<td>No discernible effect</td>
<td>No discernible</td>
<td>No report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second thing to notice is how thin the evidence is for CE. Only 5 of 13 programs are at least potentially efficacious in influencing knowledge, attitudes and values; only 3 influence behavior and just one program influences academic achievement. The program Positive Action had the clearest positive results and in two domains of outcomes. The Positive Action curriculum consists of 6 units (140 lessons for elementary school, 81 lessons for seventh grade, 75 lessons for eighth grade, and 132 lessons for high school) taught over consecutive days in scripted lessons by trained teachers (typical lessons last about 15 minutes). The lessons are infused by the philosophy “You feel good about yourself when you think and do positive actions, and there is a positive way to do everything,” and involve classroom discussion, role-play, games, songs and activity sheets.

The Too Good for Violence (TGV) and Too Good for Drugs and Violence (TGDV) programs are also highly promising. These programs are included in WWC because they infuse character traits into most of the lessons. TFV consists of seven 30- to 60-minute lessons per elementary grade level and nine 30- to 45-minute lessons for middle school. All lessons are scripted and teachers are trained to deliver them. Lessons concern peaceful conflict resolution and prosocial skill development in the areas of goal-setting, decision making, anger and stress management, among others. Eight character values are addressed: caring, cooperation, courage, fairness, honesty, respect, responsibility, and self-discipline. TGDV consists of 14 core curriculum lesson at 60 minutes each that are intended to be infused in subject area content. What is interesting about TFDV is that many lessons include information about normative peer drug use, which other research has shown to be the most effective component of drug prevention programs (Andrews, Hampson, & Peterson, 2011; McAlaney, Bewick, & Hughes, 2011). Many teens overestimate the degree to which peers are engaged in substance use (and other risk behavior), and correcting faulty perceptions of peer normative behavior is a highly recommended instructional goal. TGDV also engages in skill-development (e.g., goal-setting, decision making, stress management, peer
resistance) and utilizes cooperative learning activities and role-playing to develop positive behaviors.

The one surprise concerns the Child Development Project (CDP). The CDP is a storied intervention that has a strongly supportive empirical basis in the literature (Battistich, 2008). The programmatic focus of the CDP was designed to enhance prosocial development by creating the condition for a caring school community (Battistich, Solomon, Watson, & Schaps, 1997). A sense of community was encouraged through activities such as collaborating on common academic goals; providing and receiving help from others; discussion and reflection upon the experiences of self and others as it relates to prosocial values such as fairness, social responsibility, and justice; practicing social competencies; and exercising autonomy by participating in decisions about classroom life and taking responsibility for it (Solomon et al., 1997). For example, teachers who hold class meetings, use cooperative learning strategies, and discuss prosocial values are more likely to foster a sense of community in students. Schools that provide cross-age buddies, homework that links school and family, and school-wide projects also promote a sense of community. Moreover the CDP encouraged an approach to classroom management that emphasized induction and developmental discipline (Watson, 2003).

Research on CDP implementations showed that program students (vs. controls) exhibited more prosocial behavior in the classroom (Solomon, Watson, Delucchi, Schaps, & Battistich, 1988), more democratic values and interpersonal understanding (Solomon, Watson, Schaps, Battistich, & Solomon, 1990), social problem-solving and conflict resolution skills (Battistich, Solomon, Watson, Solomon, & Schaps, 1989). Students in CDP schools were more likely to view their classrooms as communities, and this sense of community was positively related to self-reported concern for others, conflict resolution skills, altruistic behavior, intrinsic prosocial motivation, trust in and respect for teachers, enjoyment of helping others learn as well as observations of positive interpersonal behavior and academic engagement (Battistich, Solomon, Watson, & Schaps, 1996). When program and control students entered the same intermediate school, former program students were rated higher by teachers at eighth grade in conflict resolution skills, self-esteem, assertion and popularity (Solomon, Watson, & Battistich, 2002).

But this highly encouraging evidence is not reflected in the WWC scorecard, which reports no discernible evidence for Knowledge, Attitudes and Values or for Academic Achievement and only potential effectiveness for Behavior. This lower estimation of CDP effectiveness is the result of WWC recalculating statistical significance of the various outcomes using corrections for clustering within classrooms or schools and for multiple comparisons. Moreover, the average effect sizes across all findings in each of the domains were deemed not
large enough to be considered substantively important according to the WWC standards (i.e., at least 0.25).

**What Works for Character Education (WWCE)**

Marvin Berkowitz and his colleagues have also examined the literature in search for what works in character education (Berkowitz et al., 2008; Berkowitz & Bier, 2004). Their search identified more programs than did the WWC, including 69 program outcome studies (representing 33 CE programs) along with more extensive reviews of the literatures on the effects of moral discussion (over 100 studies on this topic alone) and on a specific CE program (Teaching Students to Be Peacemakers) that is based on cooperative learning. Berkowitz et al. (2008) note two reasons for the difference in the pool of studies reviewed by the two projects. First, the WWC used a more restrictive definition of what counts as a character education program, focusing their attention only on programs that targeted an explicit character trait or moral and ethical reasoning development. Hence WWC adopted a narrow, nonexpansive view of MCE (in terms used earlier) or, alternatively, the WWC only considered programs were CE was considered a *treatment*. In contrast, WWCE used a less restrictive (and hence broad, expansive) definition and included studies that focused on *outcomes* of interest to CE as instances of CE. Second, as noted earlier, the WWC used rigorous methodological inclusion criteria to screen studies eligible for review. WWCE was also interested in studies that used comparative designs but otherwise was less restrictive with respect to methodological inclusion criteria.

There was overlap in the programs reviewed by the two “what works” projects. Seven programs were in common of the 33 programs reviewed by WWCE and the 13 reviewed by WWC. Of these seven there was disagreement about two of them (Facing History and Ourselves and Lions Quest Skills for Action was deemed ineffective by WWC but effective by WWCE). But there was agreement that four programs held in common showed at least some evidence of effectiveness (Building Decision Skills, Child Development Project, Lions Quest Skills for Adolescents and Positive Action) and that one did not (Heartwood Ethics Curriculum). Program effectiveness was also reported for five programs in WWC that was not included by WWCE (Connect with Kids, Lessons in Character, and the three Too Good for Kids programs).

The programs deemed effective and uniquely reviewed by WWCE were an eclectic and varied lot. It included just community schools and moral dilemma discussion strategies. It included programs that focused on social competency and social decision-making, life-skills training, problem solving and peacemaking. Positive youth development was included as effective CE. One program, Roots of Empathy, is a program for school-age children that provide opportunities for structured interactions with a baby over the course of the child’s early
development (Gordon, 2005). Students observe baby’s development and learn to name feelings and on this basis become fluent in emotional literacy that allows students to resist bullying, taunting, and cruelty; and to lay the foundation for caring, safe classrooms and schools. Research shows that Roots of Empathy is associated with increases in social and emotional knowledge, prosocial behavior (sharing and helping) and perceptions of caring classrooms; and decreases in aggressive behavior (Schonert-Reichl & Scott, 2005).

WWCE also includes the Seattle Social Development Project (SSDP). The project was launched in 1981 in eight Seattle public elementary schools. By 1985 it expanded to include all fifth-grade students in 18 elementary schools, with additional intervention components that targeted parents and teachers as well. The longitudinal assessments of participants continued throughout adolescence and subsequently every three years after graduation until age 27.

The SSDP was guided by a social development model that assumed that one becomes socialized within the norms of a social group to the extent that (1) one perceives opportunities for involvement, (2) becomes actually involved, (3) has the skill for involvement and interaction, and (4) perceives that it is rewarding to do so. When socialization goes well a social bond of attachment and commitment is formed. This social bond, in turn, orients the child to the norms and expectations of the group to which one is attached and to the values endorsed by the group. “It is hypothesized that the behavior of the individual would be prosocial or antisocial depending on the predominant behaviors, norms and values held by those individuals and institutions to which/whom the individual bonded” (Catalano, Haggerty et al., 2004, p. 251).

The SSDP included interventions that targeted three primary socialization agents of school-age children: teachers, parents, and peers. Teachers were given training in proactive classroom management, interactive teaching to motivate learners, and cooperative learning. The intervention for children targeted social and emotional skill development, including interpersonal cognitive problem-solving skills and refusal skills. Parental training targeted behavior management, how to give academic support and skills to reduce risks for drug use.

Research showed that training teachers to use targeted teaching practices was successful in promoting both school bonding and academic achievement (Abbott et al., 1998). Moreover, the SSDP demonstrated long-term positive effects on numerous adolescent health-risk behaviors (e.g., violent delinquency, heavy drinking, sexual intercourse, having multiple sex partners, pregnancy and school misconduct) and on school bonding (Hawkins et al., 1999; Hawkins, Guo, Hill, Battin-Pearson, & Abbott, 2001). For example, school bonding at 12th grade, and increases in school bonding between 7th and to 12th grade, was negatively correlated with use of alcohol, cigarettes, marijuana, and other drug use at 12th grade. Students bonded to school at 5th and 6th grade were less likely to become
minor or major offenders in middle school. Students with lower sense of school attachment and commitment were twice as likely to join gangs as were students with a stronger sense of school bonding. Moreover school bonding also had positive academic outcomes. For example, an increase in school bonding between 7th and 12th grade was associated with higher GPA and lower student misconduct at 12th grade. Students with greater bonding to school at 8th grade were less likely to drop out of school by 10th grade (see Catalano, Berglund, Ryan, Lonczak, & Hawkins, 2004, for a review).

Hence the intensive multicomponent interventions of the SSDP had clear effects on school bonding and on a range of outcomes of traditional interest to character educators, including substance use, delinquency, gang membership, violence, academic problems, and sexual activity. Although the work of the SSDP is guided by the social development model and not by considerations of virtue, morality of character, it reports outcomes of interest to character educators, and for this reason is included in the WWCE data base (as opposed to the WWC data base, which only includes programs that are interventions more narrowly linked to morality).

As noted earlier the distinction between CE as treatment and as outcome is an important one between the WWC and the WWCE data bases. Berkowitz et al. (2008) provide the variable outcome taxonomy that guided their coding of CE programs in the WWCE project. At the most general level outcome variables were coded into one of four categories: Risk Behavior, Prosocial Competencies, School-Based Outcomes and General Social-Emotional. At the intermediate level it is evident that most of what we think of with respect to moral-character is located under the heading of Prosocial Competencies. Some of the intermediate categories here include Socio-Moral Cognition, Personal Morality, Prosocial Behavior and Attitudes, and Character Knowledge, among others.

The intermediate concepts under the other general headings cast a much wider net over psychosocial functioning. For example, under the general rubric “General Social-Emotional” is grouped intermediate variables such as Self-Concept, Independence and Initiative, Coping, Problem-Solving Skills, Emotional Competency, and Attitudes and Beliefs (about older people, school, the future). Under the general rubric School-Based Outcomes are intermediate variables such as School Behavior (e.g., attendance, detentions, skipping school, compliance with rules), Attachment to School, Attitudes Toward School, Attitudes Toward Teachers, Academic Goal, Expectations and Motives, Academic Achievement and Academic Skills. The general category Risk Behavior has six intermediary categories that includes Knowledge and Beliefs (about risk), Drug Use, Sexual Behavior, Protective Skills (e.g., refusal skills), Violence/Aggression and General Misbehavior (e.g., gang activity, lying, rude behavior, stealing). This gives one a sense of the wide terrain that WWCE attempted to map.
Berkowitz et al. (2008) report how often these variables were statistically significant across the various research studies examined in the database. Table 7.4 is a summary of the top ten intermediate variables that reported significant effects and also the top 10 variables with the highest percentage of significant effects.

Table 7.4 Summary of Significant Effects for What Works in Character Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ten most commonly reported significant effects</th>
<th>Variables with highest percentage of significant effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>N of significant effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-moral cognition</td>
<td>82/111 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosocial behaviors</td>
<td>71/167 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-solving skills</td>
<td>54/84 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug use</td>
<td>51/104 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence/aggression</td>
<td>50/104 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School behavior</td>
<td>40/88 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/attitudes about risk behavior</td>
<td>35/73 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional competency</td>
<td>32/50 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic achievement</td>
<td>31/52 tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment to school</td>
<td>19/32 tested</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Berkowitz, Battistich, & Bier (2008)

On the basis of these outcomes Berkowitz et al. (2008) draw at least three conclusions. First, CE can promote character development. When the WWC and WWCE findings are jointly considered, 39 programs show some evidence of effectiveness. Second, CE positively influences academic achievement. Third, and as Table 7.4 illustrates, CE has broad impact on a wide variety of psychosocial outcomes.

Effective Delivery Mechanisms

Effective strategies for educating moral character are not always straightforward. In this section we compare traditional implementation strategies (i.e., those relying on explicit persuasion, teaching of skills, or changes in classroom culture) to new indirect or “stealthy” intervention strategies (Miller & Prentice, in press; Robinson, in press; Yeager & Walton, 2011).
Are Traditional Intervention Methods Frequently Effective?

It is important to carefully consider traditional methods of moral character education because even programs that seem intuitively effective can have no effect or, at worst, do harm—even when the participants themselves say it was helpful. For example, Silvia et al. (2010) delivered a two-pronged intervention to reduce youth violence in the context of a randomized experiment including 7,000 middle school students. They delivered (1) a 16-lesson classroom curriculum that targeted effective problem-solving skills, motivation and self-efficacy for those skills, and attitudes about the utility of violence, and (2) a whole-school component that included a review and refinement of school discipline policies, public and positive reinforcement of prosocial behaviors, clarification of behavioral expectations, and systematic review of discipline data. After one year, this intervention had no effect on violence, victimization, safety concerns, prosocial behavior, attitudes toward violence, or strategies for coping with aggression—despite evidence that the intervention was delivered reasonably well by teachers and administrators (Silvia et al., 2010).

That interventions can harm is illustrated by the well-known Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study (McCord, 1978; see also Ross & Nisbett, 1991), an ambitious early effort to promote character among at-risk youth. In 1939, more than 500 boys aged 5 to 13 were randomly assigned to either a comprehensive youth development treatment group or to a control group. In the treatment group, boys and their families met with counselors twice per month; they received tutoring and psychiatric help; they attended summer camp; and they joined the Boy Scouts, the YMCA, or a similar program. In effect, they received every service that, at that time, was thought to transmit moral character. In the control group, none of these services were provided. Yet 30 years later, boys in the treatment group were no less likely to have committed a crime (McCord, 1978). In fact, the intervention seemed to cause harm. Men who were in the treatment group were more likely to have committed more than one crime; more likely to be alcoholic, have a diagnosis for a serious mental illness, and have a stress-related disease; and less likely to be satisfied with their careers. Treated men also died at younger ages (McCord). Shockingly, in a survey 30 years after the treatment, two thirds said that the program benefitted them, even though the evidence suggested it did not.

These are not isolated results. Meta-analyses and narrative reviews have frequently found that well-intentioned youth development intervention strategies can do harm (Dishion, McCord, & Poulin, 1999; Lilienfeld, 2007; Rhule, 2005). This was true in the case of Scared Straight programs—a practice of having youth spend a night in jail, or other harsh experiences, in order to deter criminal
behavior. These programs increased the odds of committing a crime by an odds ratio of nearly 1.6 (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, & Buehler, 2003). Similarly, zero tolerance policies, which deliver severe consequences for a single instance of undesirable behavior, not only fail to reduce conduct problems in school but also increases racial inequalities in discipline by justifying racial profiling (Skiba et al., 2006). DARE or other programs designed to help teens resist social influence seem to increase the use of alcohol or other drugs, perhaps by teaching them about new drug-use strategies and facilitating conversations with peers about carrying them out (Werch & Owen, 2002). And anti-bullying interventions conducted in high schools frequently increase the rate of bullying in a school (Cowie & Olafsson, 2000; DeSouza & Ribeiro, 2005; Hanewinkel, 2004; Kaiser-Ulrey, 2003; Metropolitan Area Child Study Research Group, 2002; Pepler, Craig, Ziegler, & Charach, 1994; Roland, 2000); in effect, they appear to teach adolescents new methods for harming each other.

**Explanations for Null or Negative Effects of Interventions**

Why are many interventions ineffective? And why do some interventions seem to cause harm? Numerous explanations have been proposed. One frequent explanation is that such extensive efforts are not enough—that the problematic behaviors targeted by the intervention are deep-seated and require longer, more comprehensive treatments. Although this would explain the null findings, they do not explain the negative effects of several interventions. Moreover, as documented below, smaller but more targeted interventions frequently have sustained positive effects even when “larger” interventions have been ineffective (Miller & Prentice, in press; for examples in the academic domain, c.f. Yeager & Walton, 2011).

Another explanation is that when interventions involve lessons, moral appeals, direct persuasion, and explicit rehearsing of artificial scenarios, they can seem heavy-handed to adolescents. As a result, they run the risk of making the given moral habit seem externally imposed and outside of a student’s own identity. This has the potential to undermine internalization and shorten the effect of an intervention. That is, when students leave the classroom or moral education setting and are with their peers or at home, they may be less likely to employ the targeted behavior or strategy if they were only endorsing it out of compliance to the teacher’s appeals and not due to a personal decision. To the extent that adolescents adopt an oppositional identity, a heavy-handed intervention may even increase their motivation to reject its message. Alternatively, even among adolescents who change their behavior in the short term, they may also come to believe that they could only maintain a level of moral behavior while the intervention persists, and abandon it once the intervention ends. Overall, these
possibilities potentially create an ironic position for moral character educators: the more persuasive, direct, and powerful a lesson, the more likely it may be to have only short-term effect, if any at all.

Failed interventions may also be limited when they are transparent to the student and to the teacher. When the goal of the activity or lesson is clearly to help them do more of a given moral behavior or have more of a given character trait, it could be offensive to adolescents if it implied that they are in need of a change in their moral behavior. For other adolescents, offers of help could be stigmatizing and reinforce negative stereotypes. Indeed, past efforts to improve the achievement of African American students have documented that framing assistance as remedial can undermine its effectiveness, while framing it as honorific or neutral can increase its effectiveness (e.g., Steele, 1997; Treisman, 1985). Indeed, evidence increasingly suggests that moral character education is not as straightforward as the teaching of math or history content. In general, the more math or history a student is taught, the more they learn. But the teaching of moral character may require a lighter, more nuanced touch.

It should be noted, however, that if traditional heavy-handed and transparent delivery mechanisms of MCE are problematic because they threaten adolescent autonomy and potentially stigmatize students, then these traditional interventions might be less effective for adolescents than they are for children, who are less vigilant to stigma (Brown & Bigler, 2005) and who have different identity and autonomy concerns than adolescents (Erikson, 1968). In fact, a series of recent meta-analyses of interventions to reduce bullying follow this trend: antibullying programs that explicitly teach character traits such as respect and empathy are frequently successful for younger children, but as children age and increase in autonomy these interventions are, in general, less effective (Fossu, Handegård, Martinussen, & Mørch, 2008; Merrell, Gueldner, Ross, & Isava, 2008; Smith, Schneider, Smith, & Ananiadou, 2004; Vreeman & Carroll, 2007; Wilson & Lipsey, 2007). In some regards, age differences may explain why some of the MCE programs reviewed in the previous section documented effectiveness, while others did not. Indeed, one important area for future research is to explicitly test whether developmental and individual differences in autonomy will explain the differential effectiveness of traditional interventions.

Additional research finds that moral character education interventions can unintentionally create bonds between peers who share knowledge or motivation about a negative behavior, and these bonds can in turn reinforce the peers’ behaviors rather than prevent them. This idea, called deviancy training or iatrogenic effects is especially relevant for the Cambridge-Somerville study (Dishion & Tipsord, 2010), and is a danger any time an MCE program involves group activities or off-site retreats for small, targeted groups of at-risk peers. In the Cambridge-Somerville study, by sending boys at high risk for conduct problems to summer camps together, it may have created social ties between them and
therefore created more opportunities for them to share techniques for rule-breaking (McCord 2003). A large number of subsequent studies that have analyzed adolescents’ social networks have shown that problem behaviors are “contagious” (Dishion & Tipsord, 2011), and that interventions can accelerate their transmission. For instance, Valente et al. (2007) conducted a peer-led substance use (alcohol and drugs) reduction intervention among adolescents. The authors found that it increased substance among students who had friends who used those substances, while it decreased substance use among those who had social networks that did not include substance users (Valente et al., 2007). As happens with any contagion, an intervention that creates sustained contact between participants can have the effect of spreading negative outcomes. For this reason, Dodge, Dishion, and Lansford (2006) argued that interventions should be evaluated using randomized experiments, and that efforts should be taken to prevent deviancy training. This includes (1) delivering interventions to full classes of students instead of only “at-risk” participants (that is, universal interventions versus targeted interventions), and (2) reducing opportunities for unstructured or poorly supervised peer interactions during “group work” activities in interventions.

In sum, much research has assumed that as long as one knows what moral habit or skill to increase, then directly teaching it or trying to affect it will improve moral outcomes. But this is not always the case, especially for adolescents. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the delivery mechanisms used to teach moral character—rather than only the psychological target of such efforts—are likely to produce the intended change in the age group one is targeting. Next, we do so by comparing traditional intervention strategies to novel, or “stealthy” strategies.

**Indirect or “Stealthy” Interventions**

One can compare traditional moral character intervention strategies to what we call indirect or “stealthy” interventions. Traditional approaches often assume that an undesired behavior or a lack of a given character trait result because (a) people do not know the moral rule; (b) they know it but do not know how to do it; (c) they know it and know how, but do not want to. As a result, the intervention strategy is to teach knowledge directly; teach skills; or to make a persuasive appeal. Yet when none of these three factors are causes of a desired behavior, then an intervention strategy that may address them would not be expected to have an effect. Moreover, they may have the limitations noted above.

Other indirect or “stealthy” interventions rely on different assumptions and as a result use different strategies (Robinson, 2010; Yeager & Walton, 2011). Typically, indirect or “stealthy” interventions assume that (a) children or adolescents at some level know right from wrong and want to do what is right, but (b) critical barriers—such as one’s beliefs—restrain their behavior and keep them
from acting on their knowledge and motivation. Indirect interventions are designed to remove these barriers using brief changes to the subjective psychological context. They have the advantage of being “small” and minimally invasive, which is useful for promoting internalization, avoiding stigmatization, and preventing deviancy training. By avoiding direct persuasion and instead harnessing and re-directing the forces already acting on an adolescent’s behavior, they may produce more lasting behavior change (Miller & Prentice, in press; Ross & Nisbett, 1991).

This approach has been used in many past interventions (e.g., Miller & Prentice, in press). In a classic study on decreasing classroom littering among fifth grade students, Miller, Brickman, and Bolen (1975) pitted direct persuasion against a stealthy approach. They theorized that if teachers told children directly not to litter this might reduce their littering in the short term, but it would also lead students to attribute their reduced littering to a teacher’s influence and not to their own decisions. As a result, after the persuasion wore off students might return to their previous level of littering soon after the intervention. On the other hand, if students were led to see themselves as “nonlitterers” from the outset, then they might reduce their littering both in the short term and over time. Miller et al. (1975) showed that compared to a neutral control group, students in the direct persuasion condition did reduce their littering immediately, but two weeks later they had returned to preintervention levels. A group that was led to see themselves as “nonlitterers,” however, reduced their littering both in the short term and over two weeks.

A more recent “stealthy” intervention approach is illustrated by Yeager, Trzesniewski, and Dweck (in press), who conducted an intervention to reduce aggression among low-income, diverse high school students. The intervention built on past theory, which suggested that adolescents will be more likely to choose aggression when they believe that people’s traits are fixed, called an entity theory of personality (Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelaninen, & Dweck, 2011). When adolescents hold this fixed entity theory, they are more likely to conclude that believe that peers who upset them did so because they have flawed traits—that they are “bad people” who can never change. In this mind-set, they feel that vengeance is a satisfying way to solve conflicts. When adolescents are taught that people can change, called an incremental theory, however, then vengeance seems less satisfying and prosocial behavior such as confronting problems directly or educating a transgressor is more appealing (Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, et al., 2011).

Yeager et al. (in press) delivered a relatively brief but targeted universal classroom intervention that aimed to shift students’ beliefs about the malleability of people’s traits toward more of an incremental theory. The incremental theory intervention lasted six class sessions and included scientific information about how the brain works and changes, how the brain controls people’s behavior, and
how people’s behaviors and characteristics can change when the brain changes. Yeager et al. (2011) presumed that students at some level knew that aggression was not a positive method for solving problems, but students’ fixed entity theories about people’s traits were a critical barrier preventing them from putting that knowledge into practice. Results supported this notion. Compared to a control group who were taught social emotional coping skills and a no-treatment control group, the incremental theory intervention reduced aggressive responses to a peer provocation by 40%, it increased prosocial responses to provocation by more than 200%, and it led students to be more likely to be nominated by teachers for improved behavior in school. Even though Yeager et al.’s (in press) intervention did not explicitly teach or endorse moral behaviors, it impacted a psychological barrier to moral character and resulted in changed behavior.

Notably, in the case of Yeager et al.’s (in press) intervention, the desired behavior was a side effect of the intervention, not an explicit target. Because the intervention did not directly target moral character, this leads to important questions about whether such interventions can truly be considered “moral character education,” despite its effectiveness.

Conclusion and Implications

Moral character can undoubtedly be learned. Just as children with no direct instruction learn the complexities of grammar and syntax, allowing them to produce infinite sets of utterances, even young infants with no explicit teaching can learn to prefer morality and goodness over immorality and badness (e.g. Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and these judgments form the basis of a complex moral life over the course of development. In some regard, the story of moral character education is the story of the human experience of apprenticeship in the implicit curriculum of culture, and much of which happens without intentional intervention by well-meaning adults.

However, in this chapter we have not concerned ourselves with the question of whether moral character can be learned: instead, we have turned our attention to whether it can be taught. That is, given that parents, teachers, and youth workers have explicit goals for children and adolescents’ moral lives, what can be done to produce the desired outcomes? And it is this question that has produced volumes of empirical work but, unfortunately, mixed results.

We have seen that whether one has a positive or pessimistic view about the efficacy of MCE depends largely on how one defines it. When MCE is defined in a non-expansive, narrow way, and when moral character is an explicit target of a program or intervention, then cause for optimism is slight. When MCE is defined in an expansive, broad way to include programs or interventions that target a wide
range of psychosocial competencies, risk reduction or prevention, health promotion or achievement outcomes, then cause for optimism is warranted. As we have stated, this latter approach does not insist that the effective program include the language of morality, virtues or character. It will be important going forward to continue to ask: What would it mean if amoral interventions (those that do not mention virtue, morality or character) produce more ethical behavior than explicitly moral ones?

It is an open question whether MCE should be considered a curricular program—a worksheet or a lesson plan—or a set of pedagogical practices that are woven into conventional instruction. Put differently: If a school district takes seriously the educational mission of forming students with ethical character, does it look for a “program” to fit in the curriculum? If MCE is best considered a programmatic intervention then there are lessons to be learned about effective implementation from the risk, resilience, and prevention literatures. It must be guided by explicit theory. It must be comprehensive. It must involve multiple components, be initiated early in development and sustained over time. The work of the Seattle Social Development Program is a good example of this.

One advantage of programmatic approaches is that it treats seriously the requirement that MCE be addressed with intentional transparency, that it not be left to the hidden curriculum. If it is a topic of educational focus then it is presumed to require a formal curriculum. One drawback of programmatic approaches to MCE is that it treats MCE as a specialized curriculum that potentially isolates it from the rest of the instructional day. If a program involves radical reform of school structure and processes, as in the just community, or is otherwise intensive or intrusive on the school day, then its application becomes onerous and unfeasible and unlikely to be sustained over time. Moreover, the history of school reform teaches us that the effect of any standardized curriculum is bound to vary considerably across contexts and implementations: variability is the norm, not the exception (Bryk, 2009). Additionally, as noted earlier, explicit instruction in morality or character has the potential to stigmatize students by suggesting that they lack it (Yeager & Walton, 2011), a barrier that any curriculum must face.

On the other hand, perhaps MCE should not be conceptualized as a discrete object—a formal program or specialized curriculum. Intentional commitment to pedagogical practices (rather than programs) can also produce character outcomes. As we have seen, there is compelling evidence that classrooms and schools that cultivate a sense of community and school connectedness have students who embrace prosocial values, persist in school, get better grades and resist risk behavior (Monahan, Oesterle, & Hawkins, 2010; Osterman, 2000). One does not have to turn the entire school into a just community for teachers to hold class meetings or to communicate caring and respect.
School practices associated with school connectedness include teachers’ positive classroom management, opportunities to participate in extra-curricular activities and tolerant disciplinary practices (McNeely, Nonnemaker, & Blum, 2002). The National Research Council and Institute of Medicine (2004) recommend numerous practices to increase student connectedness to school, including high academic standards, a core curriculum for everyone, a de-emphasis on vocational and academic tracking, individualized advising and mentorship, and opportunities for service learning and community service. Similarly, the Eleven Principles of Character Education articulated by the Character Education Partnership provide guideposts that point not in the direction of specialized curricula but instead toward ordinary best instructional practice as the crucial element of effective character education.

It might not always be clear, then, what is and is not MCE, whether it is a treatment or outcome whether it is expansive or nonexpansive, intentional or stealthy, a program or practice. But the loss of conceptual distinctiveness for character education is offset by the gain in instructional clarity for practitioners (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006). The problem for the teacher is not one of knowing which program “works” or of correctly labeling curricular and programmatic activities, but of mastering the instructional best practices that are common to all of them (the same point has been made with respect to promoting resilience, see Howard, Dryden & Johnson, 1999).

This raises a final point, which concerns teacher formation for MCE. Nothing important happens in schools unless teachers do it. Although some elementary school teachers (particularly those who attended private religious schools of education) feel well equipped to take on MCE in the classroom (Milson & Mehlig, 2002), there is widespread recognition that preservice teacher education programs give scant attention to MCE (Jones, Ryan & Bohlin, 1999; Revell & Arthur, 2007; Schwartz, 2008). One reason is simply the daunting surfeit of training objectives that already crowd the academic curriculum of teaching majors. Narvaez and Lapsley (2008) suggested two alternatives for teacher education that map onto the distinctions here regarding kinds of MCE. A minimalist strategy assumes that best practice instruction is sufficient for moral character formation. That is, the knowledge base that supports best practice teaching is coterminous with what is known to influence the moral formation of students. Schooling and teacher practices that promote achievement overlap with practices that support student prosocial development. Making explicit this linkage should be a clear goal for teacher education.

The clear goal is to adopt a best-practice approach to instruction for MCE. Of The minimalist strategy assumes that MCE is mostly about pedagogical practices and not implementation of programs. And it insists that becoming an effective character educator does not require a substantially larger or different tool box of instructional practices than is what is required to be an effective educator.
That said, teacher educators should help preservice teachers understand how and where moral values permeate classrooms and schools, and help them understand, too, that hiding values under the blanket of instructional best practice does not relieve them of their moral duty as educators or evades the fundamentally moral purpose of education (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). Put differently, all of the 11 CEP principles of character education point to instructional best practice except one—the first principle—which draws attention to the fundamental importance of core values, but this principle might be the most important one in our zeal to train effective teachers for the cause of MCE.

The maximalist strategy assumes that MCE is mostly about programs, and that such programs are needed more than ever because of the broad changes in the way youngsters are raised in contemporary culture. Whereas the first option requires only reflective intentionality about the dual implications of best practice instruction (e.g., that it advances both academic achievement and moral character formation), the second option views best practice training as necessary but not sufficient (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). It is not sufficient because the conditions of modern child rearing are such that there is no guarantee that students will experience positive moral formation outside of school given the incidence of disconnected families and disordered communities. Increasingly schools are called on to compensate for socialization experiences gone awry in families and neighborhoods. Hence there is an argument for designing and implementing formal school-based programs for MCE.

Darcia Narvaez argues for an approach called Integrative Ethical Education (IEE) as one such option (Narvaez, 2005, 2006; Narvaez, Bock, & Endicott, 2003; Narvaez, Bock, Endicott, & Lies, 2004). IEE is guided by key findings from educational science with respect to expertise development, and includes five key steps: (1) establish caring classroom community; (2) foster a supportive climate for moral behavior and high achievement; (3) cultivate ethical skills; (4) use an apprenticeship approach to instruction (i.e., novice-to-expertise guided practice); (5) develop self-regulation skills. The first two steps (and possibly Step 4, if understood as the zone-of-proximal development) are already included in the suite of skills of the best practice instructor. The remaining steps are rooted in the four component model of moral functioning and expertise development (Narvaez & Rest, 1995).

The first component (Ethical Sensitivity) concerns the ability to perceive the dilemmatic features of our experience, to notice the need for moral action (“Knowing that”). The second component (Ethical Judgment, Reasoning and Decision Making) concerns reasoning about what to do and which response is just or fair (“Knowing what”). The third component concerns moral motivation or moral focus. It connects our moral judgment with our moral desire to be a person of a certain kind (“Knowing why”). The fourth component (Ethical Action) concerns how to put into practice the outcome of moral judgment and desiring. It
concerns the sort of implementation skills that Blasi (2005) calls willpower (self-control) and Davidson et al. (2008) call performance character. Within each component are a suite of relevant skills for which IEI provides a set of curricular activities by which to hone them to higher levels of expertise (Narvaez, Mitchell, Endicott, & Bock, 1999).

Whether the framework is CEP principles or the four components of IEE, these will have to find a place in the teacher education curriculum. Berkowitz (1999) suggested a course of study or preservice mentorship that focuses on developing character knowledge, skill acquisition, and values. This requires teacher education faculty, or at least specialist faculty, who are knowledgeable about moral character and who believe it important enough to build into the teacher formation curriculum. We would take this one-step further. It may turn out that the most important component of teacher education is the presence of moral candidates to begin with. Put differently, the best prospect for MCE in the schools may lie in the selection and recruitment of teacher education candidates who possess the moral mindsets to become effective teachers in the schools. This would seem to be an exciting target of future research.

References


